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Abstract
Overconfidence is one of the most important biases in financial markets and commonly
associated with excessive trading and asset market bubbles. So far, most of the finance
literature takes overconfidence as a given, “static” personality trait. In this paper we
introduce a novel experimental design which allows us to track different measures of
overconfidence during an asset market bubble. The results show that overconfidence co-
moves with asset prices and points towards a feedback loop in which overconfidence adds
fuel to the flame of existing bubbles.
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1 Introduction
Traders are often overconfident about the precision of their knowledge (Moore et al.,
2016). Such bias is known as overprecision1 and has important consequences in financial
markets both at the individual and aggregate level. For example, overprecise traders
both under-perform due to excessive trade (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 1999) and
under-diversify their portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), while markets populated
by more overprecise traders are more volatile and result in more inflated asset prices
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Michailova and Schmidt, 2016).
Yet, trader overprecision is not a “static” personality trait, but it changes endogenously
with past success and failure (Deaves et al., 2010; Hilary and Menzly, 2006; Merkle,
2017). Models of such success-driven overprecision, (e.g. Daniel and Hirshleifer, 2015;
Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001) imply a strong interdependency of trader
overprecision and asset prices dynamics: overprecise traders push up asset prices, while
rising asset prices in turn fuel traders’ overprecision.2 Therefore, endogenous overprecision
creates a feedback loop which can give rise to hump-shaped asset price dynamics (i.e.
short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices), and thereby amplify stock
price volatility and trading volume and increase the probability of asset price bubbles.
In this paper we will use an experimental asset market a` la Smith et al. (1988) (hence-
forth SSW) to study whether asset prices and traders overprecision co-move. To the best
of our knowledge, only two papers have studied the dynamics of overprecision in a context
of changing asset prices; Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) and Michailova and Schmidt
(2016). Both papers use SSW asset markets to test whether the subjects’ overprecision in
asset price beliefs changes over the course of a bubble-burst pattern. They find that, on
average, overprecision is larger in market episodes that are associated with higher asset
prices and lower in market episodes that are associated with lower asset prices. This im-
1Moore and Healy (2008) differentiate between three types of overconfidence: overestimation of one’s
true abilities, performance, or level of control (e.g. someone beliefs to have answered 10 questions of a
quiz correctly, but actually only got five correct); overplacement of one’s abilities or performance relative
to others (e.g. almost everyone beliefs to be an above-average driver); and overprecision as an excessive
faith in the quality of one’s judgment (e.g. stating that the Dow Jones will go up by 167.38 points in the
next two weeks).
2A related co-movement of asset prices and overprecision is postulated by (Tuckett and Taﬄer, 2008),
who argue that the overprecision of traders changes with the emotions and the excitement of significant
profit opportunities during asset price bubbles.
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plicit evidence suggests that asset prices and the overprecision of the subjects are indeed
interrelated. Yet, their design cannot rule out that such overprecision dynamics are driven
by factors other than asset price dynamics, such as, uncertainty about the asset market
(e.g., Hanaki et al., 2018), learning and experience (e.g., Griffin and Tversky, 1992), or
cognitive biases related to the market (e.g., wishful thinking) (e.g., Caplin and Leahy,
2019).
In contrast, we present a novel design that allows us to perfectly disentangle the effect
of asset prices on overconfidence from any confounding market factors. First, we provide
a new, and simple, way to measure individual overprecision by asking subjects about the
expected error of their beliefs. Second, we apply our new overprecision measure to a new
task which is completely unrelated to the asset market. This design gives us a “clean”
measure of overprecision free of any market biases or learning.
The findings are clear: overprecision co-moves with asset prices. When asset prices
go up, overprecision rises, and when asset prices go down, overprecision falls. Moreover,
larger changes in prices are met by larger changes in overprecision. Additionally, we
observe that, as predicted by the theory (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and Odean,
2001), becoming wealthy makes traders overprecise, yet, becoming overprecise does not
make traders wealthy. In fact, in line with ample theoretical and empirical evidence, we
observe that overprecision is negatively correlated with total profits. Finally, we confirm
the known result that high cognitive ability results in higher market performance.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Asset Market
We employ a variant of the standard Smith et al. (1988) (henceforth: SSW) asset market
experiment. Each session consists of two consecutive asset markets with nine subjects
per market. The particular market design and parametrization is based on Haruvy et al.
(2007) and has subjects trading an asset for fifteen periods. At the beginning of each
market, subjects receive an endowment of assets and Talers (our experimental currency)
which they can use to trade.3 At the end of each period, each asset pays a random
3Three subjects received 112 Talers and three assets, three got two assets and 292 Talers, and the
remaining three traders got one asset and 472 Talers.
3
dividend of either 0, 4, 14 or 30 Talers, each with equal probability. The dividend is
independent across periods. The balance of Talers and assets carries over from period
to period until the end of the market (period 15) at which point the asset pays its last
dividend and disappears. At the end of the experiment Talers are converted into euro at
a conversion rate of e 1 for every 100 Talers.
Because the market is finite and the expected dividend of the asset is the same at
every period, the fundamental value of the asset at period t can be easily calculated as
12 · (16 − t). Thus, the fundamental value of the asset is monotonically decreasing with
every period. To make calculations easier for our subjects, we provided them with a table
showing the fundamental value of the asset for each round.
Following Haruvy et al. (2007), the market utilizes call market rules; all subjects
simultaneously make a single buy and sell order at the beginning of each trading period.
Buy orders consist of the maximum price they are willing to pay, and the desired quantity.
Likewise, sell orders consist of a minimum selling price and the number of assets that they
are willing to sell.4 These buy and sell orders are aggregated into a supply and demand
curve which determine the market-clearing price.5 Those subjects who submitted buy
orders above the market clearing price buy assets, while those that submitted sell orders
below the market clearing price sell assets. In case of a tie, a “virtual” coin is flipped to
determine who will trade.
2.2 Overprecision
Most previous efforts to study overprecision in asset markets are based on eliciting con-
fidence intervals (e.g., Glaser and Weber, 2007; Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2002). This
approach, however, is a problematic, as subjects do not seem to understand the concept of
confidence intervals and confidence intervals are hard to incentivize (Moore et al., 2016).
Therefore, we propose a new, and simple, way to measure the overprecision of our subjects
based on asking subjects the following two questions6:
4Subjects could not make bids that were higher than their asks. Likewise, bids and asks are subject
to their budget constrains and their current asset holdings.
5We follow the algorithm proposed by Palan (2018). The market-clearing price is defined as the
volume-maximizing price. Note that in cases where there is a continuum of market clearing prices, the
mean value of the continuum is used.
6These questions will be adjusted as necessary for the particular dimension of interest.
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1. Please give us your best estimate for . . .
2. How far away do you think your estimate is from the true answer?
A subject is said to be overprecise if the expected estimation error is smaller than
the true estimation error. Analogously, a subject is said to be underprecise if the ex-
pected estimation error is larger than the true estimation error. Unlike the elicitation of
confidence intervals and measures of subjective certainty, our approach is intuitive, and,
importantly, can accommodate any incentivization system.
We apply our new method to elicit overprecision along two separate dimensions; (i)
price-prediction overprecision which is the overprecision in asset price beliefs and (ii)
context-independent overprecision which completely unrelated to the market. While over-
precision in asset price beliefs may be confounded with other market biases (e.g., wishful
thinking) or the learning that is so prevalent in SSW asset markets, the goal of the context-
independent measure of overprecision is to have a “clean” measure of overprecision free of
any confounding factors. By completely isolating the measure of overprecision from the
market, we get a transparent measure through which we can clearly identify the effect of
asset price dynamics on the overprecision of subjects. Therefore, our main interest lies in
the context-independent measure of overprecision. Price-prediction overprecision, on the
other hand, will mainly serve as a control for our regression analysis.
Price-Prediction Overprecision
The advantage of call market rules is that each market round has a unique market-
clearing price. This allows us to elicit subjects’ price beliefs and their associated price-
prediction overprecision by asking the following two questions at the beginning of each
trading period:
1. Please give us your best estimate for the price of the asset in this period.
2. How far away do you think your price estimate is from the true answer?
To incentivize both questions, we follow Haruvy et al. (2007); subjects get paid e 0.25,
if their guess is within 10% of the realized price, e 0.10, if within 25%, e 0.05, if within
50%, and e 0 otherwise. Earnings from prices predictions are paid out on-the-go and can
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Figure 1: “Dot-Spot” Task
be used for asset purchases in subsequent rounds. We choose this incentivation scheme
over more sophisticated alternatives, such as the quadratic scoring rule (Brier, 1950) or
the binarized scoring rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013), as Haruvy et al. (2007) show that
this system is easy for subjects to understand and they find no evidence of any system-
atic bias in subjects answers. To avoid that subjects hedge between both the questions,
subjects are randomly paid according to one or the other question.
Context-Independent Overprecision
To elicit context-independent overprecision subjects take part in a task we call “Dot
Spot”. In this task, subjects are flashed for six seconds with a matrix of 20× 20 red and
blue dots like the one shown in Figure 1. Subjects are then asked to answer two questions:
1. Please estimate the total number of red dots in the Dot-Spot matrix.
2. How far away do you think is your estimate from the true answer?
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The incentivation scheme for these questions is analogous to the scheme for the price-
prediction overprecision, with the sole difference that outcomes from the Dot-Spot, and
thus the earnings, are not revealed and paid out until the completion of all markets.
We measure context-independent overprecision at three different “Dot-Spot breaks”
that will take place before the start of each market (Break 1), after trading period 6
(Break 2), and after trading period 13 (Break 3).7 In each of these breaks, subjects take
part in five consecutive rounds of the “Dot Spot” task. The unique Context-independent
measure of overprecision per subject per break is then determined by the median of all
five rounds.
To make breaks comparable, in each break three of the five matrices will be “similar.”
“Similar” matrices are generated using a uniform distribution with support between 45±5,
75 ± 5, or 325 ± 5 in each Dot-Spot break. The other two matrices will be drawn from
an uniform distribution with the support of 200 ± 125 red dots. The order of the five
matrices will be random within each break.
Importantly, while “similar” matrices have a similar number of dots, the disposition of
these dots is different. In other words, even though the number of dots is almost identical,
the distribution of the red and blue dots is unique.8
2.3 Control Treatment
In the control treatment, we generate asset markets where the price of the asset is both
exogenous and certain. Following Akiyama et al. (2017) and Hanaki et al. (2018), in each
market one human subject is paired to eight computerized traders which buy and sell at
fundamental value. Because of the call market rules, in all rounds, the market clearing
price will be equal to the (downward sloping) fundamental value of the asset. The goal of
the control treatment is to check whether there are any dynamics in overprecision (driven
by, e.g., the random choice of the dot-spot matrices or the mere repetition of dot-spot
tasks) in the absence of endogenous asset price dynamics.
7One of the reasons that we decided to use SSW markets is that we could ex-ante predict when it
would be best to “interrupt” the market to get a sample of overprecision at the top of the bubble and
after the bubble has exploded. Figure 2 shows that our predictions were pretty good and in 75% of our
cases we are able to measure overprecision almost at the top of the bubble, and immediately after its
crash.
8See Figure 4 in Appendix A, which shows two “similar” matrices with the exactly the same number
of red dots, but different pattern side-by-side.
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2.4 Personality traits
The experimental literature has shown that personality traits significantly affect the be-
havior of subjects in SSW markets (e.g., Bosch-Rosa et al., 2018; Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn,
2015; Michailova and Schmidt, 2016). To control for personality traits in our data analysis,
once the two asset markets are over, subjects take part in several personality tests.
First, we elicit cognitive ability through CRT (Frederick, 2005), CRT2 (Thomson and
Oppenheimer, 2016) and eCRT (Toplak et al., 2014) questions, as cognitive ability has
been shown to correlate with performance in SSW markets (Noussair et al., 2016). We
then ask them about the number of questions they expected to have answered correctly
and their expected relative ranking amongst all subjects in the session. This gives us a
measure of overestimation and overplacement, respectively, which along overprecision are
the other two types of overconfidence commonly accepted in the literature (Moore and
Healy, 2008).
Additionally, we elicit the risk aversion of subjects using a Holt and Laury (2002)
multiple price list and the non-incentivized risk question from the German Socio Economic
Panel (“How likely are you to take risk on a scale of 0 (not risk taking at all) to 10 (very
prone to take risk)”), as risk aversion affects the size of bubbles in SSW markets (Eckel
and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015).9 Finally, we ask subjects to answer the ten-item version of the
Big Five personality test suggested by Rammstedt and John (2007) as, in SSW markets,
extraversion and neuroticism affect the trading behavior of subjects (Oehler et al., 2018)
and the size and the length of asset price bubbles (Oehler et al., 2019).
3 Results
The experiment had thirteen sessions, twelve with our baseline design and one with a
downward price robustness check (see Section 2.3). A total of 117 subjects were recruited
through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). All sessions lasted approximately two hours and fifteen
minutes and were run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Technische Uni-
versita¨t Berlin. The experiment was programmed and conducted using oTree (Chen et al.,
2016) and the Dot-Spot task used D3.js (Bostock et al., 2011). Subjects made on aver-
age e 26.20, and before the start of the experiment took part in a quiz that tested their
9For our regressions we will combine both risk measures into one single Risk Aversion measure. For
details see Appendix B.
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knowledge on the rules of the market, and several rounds of Dot-Spot with performance
feedback.
3.1 Asset Price Dynamics and Context-Independent Overprecision
In Figure 2 we plot the market clearing price (red, solid line) and the downward sloping
fundamental value (gray, solid line) for the first market of each session (for results ad
analysis of the second market see Appendix C). The vertical lines denote where the Dot-
Spot breaks take place and the blue dots show the price of the asset immediately before
the break.10 From Figure 2 it is apparent that most markets show an asset price bubble,
as is standard in SSW markets.
More interestingly, in eight of the twelve sessions we observe that the price immediately
before the second Dot-Spot break (p6) is larger than the price at the beginning of the
market (p0), and also larger than the price before the third Dot-Spot brake (p13), i.e.
p0 < p6 > p13. These sessions are the ones we are most interested in as such a price
dynamics allows us to study the full spectrum of a complete bubble-burst episode. We
call these sessions, Hump Shape sessions.
In sessions 9 to 12, p0 < p6 < p13, so we cannot study the effects that a bubble burst
has on the overprecision of subjects. Yet, we can still use these sessions to study whether
such sustained price increases raise the level of the subjects’ overprecision further. We
call these sessions, Increasing Price sessions. Finally, we call the computerized sessions
with monotonically decreasing prices Decreasing Price sessions.
In each Dot-Spot break subjects face five different matrices. We will define the the
context-independent overprecision of subject i for matrix j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in break b ∈
{1, 2, 3} as:11
DotOPijb = |RedGuessijb −RedTruejb| − ErrorGuessijb, (1)
where ErrorGuessijb is the expected error stated by the subject, RedGuessijb is the
guess of red dots made by the subject, and RedTruejb is the correct answer. There-
fore, when DotOPijb > 0, the larger DotOPijb the more overprecise a subject is, and
10Notice that the first Dot-Spot break took place before the market started, so we don’t have a price
before that market. Instead we put the blue dot at the first price realized in the market immediately
after the Dot-Spot task.
11To ease notation we ignore the fact that there are two markets in each session and drop this subindex.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium price (red line), fundamental value (solid black line), and Dot-Spot breaks (vertical
black lines) for Market 1 of all sessions. To have a better understanding of the price dynamics we place
blue dots at the equilibrium price immediately before the dot spot took place (i.e., p6 and p13). For the
first break we place the dot on top of the first realized price (p1)
when DotOPijb < 0, the smaller DotOPijb is, the more underprecise a subject is. When
DotOPijb = 0, then the subject is perfectly calibrated. To have a unique measure of
context-independent overprecision for each Dot-Spot break b, we take the median across
all DotOPijb for each subject. This aggregate measure is denoted MDotOPib and serves
as the measure of context-independent overprecision we will use for the rest of the paper.
In Figure 3 we present the MDotOPib for each break across price dynamic sub-groups
(from left to right, Decreasing Price, Hump Shape, Increasing Price). The figure clearly
shows that the overprecision of the median subject follows our hypothesized trajectory:
a) it is downward trending for Computerized sessions b) goes up and then down in Hump
Shape sessions, and c) it is upward trending for Increasing Price sessions.12
To test whether these differences across breaks are statistically significant, we perform
12We plot the individual session box plots for each session in Figure 5 of Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Box plots showing the median, 25th and 75th percentile of MDotOPib for each break within a
session.
a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing MDotOPib of subjects across breaks for
the Hum -Shape and Increasing Price sessions. The p-values are summarized in Table 1.
Our interest lies in the Hump Shape sessions as they allow us to test a wider range of price
effects on overprecision. In this case we see how the differences between breaks are highly
significant; as prices climb, so does the context-independent overprecision. Interestingly,
the effect on overprecision is reversed when the bubble bursts and prices drop.
The results for the Increasing Price sessions show no differences between consecutive
breaks. Yet, the overall trend (between the first and the third break) is significant at the
5% level. This is intuitive, as the increasing price sessions have, on average, relatively
lower prices in the middle break and high prices in the latter. Additionally, the lower
number of observations means less power, and therefore the need of a bigger effect to
detect statistical differences.
A similar story can be told when comparing the breaks in the Decreasing Price sessions.
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While the differences across breaks are, yet again, not significant at the 5% level, the trend
of the measured overprecision in Figure 3, the low number of observations, and the results
for the other sub-groups make it reasonable to associate the fall of overprecision with the
fall in market prices.
Break 1 = Break 2 Break 2 = Break 3 Break 1 = Break 3
Hump-shaped p-value (N=72) 0.001 0.010 0.198
Increasing Price p-value (N=36) 0.587 0.299 0.030
Decreasing Price p-value (N=9) 0.314 0.440 0.085
Table 1: P -values resulting from Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test comparing the equality of
matched pairs of observations across Dot-Spot task across different session sub-groups.
Result 1: Overprecision co-moves with asset prices and carries over to out-of-context
tasks.
Next, we want to quantify the effects that price dynamics have on the change in their
overprecision. To do so, we define the change in context-independent overprecision as:
∆MDotOPi(b,b′) = MDotOPib′ −MDotOPib, (2)
where b′ and b are different breaks in a market, and b′ > b. So, for example, ∆MDotOPi(1,2)
is the change in overprecision from the first to the second Dot-Spot break for individual
i.
In Table 2 we regress ∆MDotOP1,2 on the change in asset prices (Price-Difference)
and several personality measures.13 We divide the data into three different models: In the
first model we regress the change in overprecision between the first and second Dot-Spot
break (∆MDotOP1,2) on the difference in price for the first and sixth round (∆Price1 =
P6 − P1).
14 The second model regresses the change in overprecision between the second
and third Dot-Spot break (∆MDotOP2,3) on the difference in price between the 13th
and 6th period (∆Price2 = P13 − P6), while the third model compares the change in
13Notice that for ease of notation from now on we will drop the individual subject index i for
∆MDotOPb,b′
14Again, to ease notation we drop the session index for ∆Price1 as it follows that for each subject we
use the prices of her session.
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overprecision between the last and first break (∆MDotOP1,3) and their corresponding
price change (∆Price3 = P13 − P1).
Additionally, we introduce price-prediction overprecision POPitm which is the over-
precision of subject i when predicting the equilibrium price in period t of market m:
POPitm = |PriceGuessitm − PriceCorrectitm| − PriceErrorGuessitm. (3)
Analogous to Equation (1) PriceGuessitm is the guessed price of subject i for period
t in market m, while PriceCorrectitm is the correct price, and PriceErrorGuessitm the
subjects expected error from guessing the price. We then aggregate the price-prediction
overprecision for each subject between break to get APOPi,(b,b′),m, where b and b
′ are the
different breaks in market m.
The results show that price difference across Dot-Spot breaks have significant effect
on the changes in the Context-independent measure of overprecision; across all three
breaks, the more prices increase, the more overprecise subjects become. On the other
hand, neither the accumulated price-prediction overprecision nor any of the other potential
explanatory variables seem to have any effect on changes on the change of the the context-
independent overperecision.
Result 2: The bigger the fluctuations in prices, the bigger the changes in overprecision.
3.2 The Impact of Past Performance on Overprecision
A potential driving factor of endogenous overprecision is past success and failure of fi-
nancial traders (e.g. Daniel et al., 1998; Deaves et al., 2010; Gervais and Odean, 2001).
Therefore, we study the effect that past performance has on the overprecision of our
experimental subjects. We proxy past performance by changes in the portfolios of the
subjects between periods 1, 6, and 13 (i.e. after the first and prior to the second and
third Dot-Spot break). The portfolio value of a subject i comprises her cash and her
marked-to-market assets holdings at the end of trading periods 1, 6, and 13. Hence, the
change in subjects i’s portfolio between breaks b′ > b is defined as as:
∆V aluei(b,b′) = pricet′ ∗ assetsi,t′ − pricet ∗ assetsi,t + cashi,t′ − cashi,t (4)
13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP1,3 ∆MDotOP1,3
∆Price1 0.0480
∗∗ 0.0500∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0198)
APOP1,2 -0.0188 -0.0178
(0.0138) (0.0139)
∆Price2 0.0341
∗ 0.0409∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0175)
APOP2,3 0.0353 0.0386
(0.0293) (0.0255)
∆Price3 0.0220
∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00644) (0.00652)
APOP1,3 0.0174 0.0179
(0.0114) (0.0117)
CRT 0.154 0.269 -0.370 -0.482 -0.329 -0.299
(0.460) (0.393) (0.587) (0.665) (0.575) (0.585)
Male -2.838 -0.822 -1.489 -3.075 -4.913 -4.611
(3.978) (3.827) (2.580) (2.252) (2.951) (2.960)
Risk Aversion -0.877 -1.058 -11.80 -12.24 -16.03∗ -15.42∗
(7.468) (8.087) (8.617) (9.511) (8.117) (7.982)
Constant 2.035 -10.87 7.804 20.10∗ 12.25 13.98
(5.588) (12.32) (6.017) (10.000) (6.947) (12.33)
N 117 117 117 117 117 117
adj. R2 0.012 0.043 0.060 0.085 0.115 0.086
Big Five No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: OLS of the change of context-independent measure of overprecision (∆MDotOPb,b′) on the
change in prices across breaks (∆Priceb), the individual level accumulated price-prediction overprecision
across breaks (APOPb,b′), and personality measures. All standard errors are clustered at the market
level.
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where pricet is the equilibrium price of the asset at round t in subject i’s session, and
assetsi,t and cashi,t are the number of assets and cash she is holding, respectively.
The results can be found in Table 3.15. In it, as in Table 2, we divide the data to study
the three different breaks. As expected, the results show that an increases (decreases) in
the value of portfolio induces an increase (decrease) of the context-independent overpre-
cision. Yet, this effect is not as strong as the effect that a pure change in prices has, and
is inexistent for the changes in portfolio between the first and third break.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP1,3 ∆MDotOP1,3
∆V alue1,2 0.00994
∗∗ 0.0103∗∗
(0.00420) (0.00402)
APOP1,2 -0.0177 -0.0152
(0.0138) (0.0141)
∆V alue2,3 0.00637
∗ 0.00815∗
(0.00329) (0.00407)
APOP2,3 0.0327 0.0354
(0.0305) (0.0274)
∆V alue1,3 0.0000325 -0.000346
(0.00502) (0.00540)
APOP1,3 0.0240
∗ 0.0240∗
(0.0121) (0.0125)
CRT -0.0900 0.0307 -0.317 -0.407 -0.360 -0.315
(0.446) (0.385) (0.562) (0.647) (0.563) (0.562)
Male -3.973 -1.984 -1.408 -2.906 -4.503 -4.147
(3.786) (3.598) (2.622) (2.348) (2.900) (2.996)
Risk Aversion -0.762 -0.721 -11.43 -11.71 -14.56 -13.72
(6.317) (7.070) (8.864) (9.852) (8.346) (8.277)
Constant 5.674 -8.482 5.295 17.29 11.72 13.52
(4.516) (11.54) (6.086) (11.02) (7.052) (13.45)
N 117 117 117 117 117 117
adj. R2 0.006 0.035 0.024 0.035 0.086 0.060
Big Five No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: OLS of the change of context-independent measure of overprecision (∆MDotOPb,b′) on the
change in portfolio value across breaks (∆V alueb), the individual level accumulated price-overprecision
across breaks (APOPb,b′), and personality measures. All standard errors are clustered at the market
level.
15Table 5 in the appendix shows the results of a similar exercise, but excluding for cash holdings.
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Result 3: The change in value of subjects’ portfolio has a weak positive effect on the
overprecision of subjects. The bigger the change in value of the portfolio, the bigger the
change in overprecision.
3.3 The Impact of Overprecision on Market Performance
While wealthy traders become overprecise, overprecise traders not necessarily become
wealthy. In fact, theory predicts that trader overprecision is negatively correlated with
profits (e.g., Odean, 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001). To test this hypothesis, we study
the effects that overprecision has on the market performance of our subjects. To do so we
regress the amount of money a subject made in the first market (Payoff i,1) on the context-
independent overprecision measured before the start of the market and the accumulated
price-prediction overprecision across the whole market (APOPi,m).
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The results can be found in Table 4 and show a strong and negative effect of baseline
overprecision on market performance; the higher the (baseline) overprecision of a subject,
the poorer she does in the asset market. Surprisingly, the accumulated price-prediction
overprecision has no effect on her market returns. Such a result seems to support our ex-
perimental design in which, to avoid confounds, we use the context-independent measure
of overprecision to study the effects of prices on overconfidence. To study how changes in
overprecision affect performance, we also introduce an interaction effect between the base-
line context-independent-overprecision and the change of this overprecision between the
first two breaks. The result shows a modest interaction effect, suggesting that the higher
the baseline overprecision, the bigger are the losses explained by changes in overpreci-
sion. Finally, our results confirm the findings of Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) and Noussair
et al. (2016), showing that CRT scores are a good predictor for performance in SSW asset
markets.
Result 4: The bigger the context-independent overprecision of a subject, the worse her
performance in the asset market.
16Payoff i,m is composed by the total amount of cash a subject ends the market. Such cash can come
from the initial endowment, trading, or the asset dividends, and does not include any payoffs from the
price belief elicitation nor the Dot-Spot tasks.
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(1) (2) (3)
Payoff Payoff Payoff
MDotOP1 -7.684
∗∗ -7.500∗∗ -6.152∗∗∗
(3.048) (3.050) (1.707)
APOP1 0.0860 0.0488 -0.0436
(0.225) (0.249) (0.172)
CRT 28.94∗∗∗ 27.10∗∗ 27.53∗∗
(8.956) (11.15) (11.22)
Male 120.8∗ 114.0∗ 118.3∗
(62.69) (61.24) (64.27)
Risk Aversion 78.46 45.12 49.00
(96.73) (115.8) (110.3)
∆MDotOP1,2 -0.643
(2.131)
∆MDotOP1,2 x MDotOP1 -0.209
∗
(0.0989)
Constant 364.2∗∗∗ 469.8 461.3
(91.40) (359.4) (345.8)
N 117 117 117
adj. R2 0.138 0.123 0.146
Big Five No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: OLS of asset market performance on baseline context-independent overprecision, accumulated
price-prediction overprecision, and other personality traits. All standard errors are clustered at the
market level.
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4 Conclusion
Overconfidence is considered one of the most significant and pervasive cognitive biases
(Kahneman, 2011; Plous, 1993). It is a well documented phenomenon among experts and
professionals in business (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008;
Malmendier et al., 2011) and financial markets (Glaser et al., 2013; Glaser and Weber,
2007; Menkhoff et al., 2013). In finances models especially, agents are assumed to be
too optimistic about the quality of their information (i.e., overprecise), which leads to
excessive trading, under-diversification, and inflated markets (Odean, 1999; Goetzmann
and Kumar, 2008; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).
Importantly, overprecision is a “dynamic” personality trait which changes endoge-
nously with past performance of traders (Deaves et al., 2010; Hilary and Menzly, 2006;
Merkle, 2017). The dynamic nature of overprecision implies a strong interdependency
between overprecision and asset price dynamics in which as asset prices go up, so does
the overprecision of traders (Daniel and Hirshleifer, 2015; Daniel et al., 1998; Gervais and
Odean, 2001). This creates a feedback loop which potentially amplifies the adverse effects
of overprecision on stock price volatility and trading volume and increases the probability
of asset price bubbles.
Against this background, in this paper we study whether prices and overprecision
indeed co-move in an experimental asset market. To do so we introduce a new way of
eliciting overprecision, and implement it in a novel experimental design which allows us
to disentangle the effect of prices on overprecision, free of any other potential confounds.
The results are clear: overprecision is dynamic and co-moves with prices. When prices
go up, so does overprecision, and when prices go down, overprecision follows. This holds
for markets with constant increases in price, constant decreases in price, and, crucially, for
markets in which bubbles fully develop, going from fast price increases to the final bust.
As is reflected in our results, the more prices increase, the more overprecision increases.
Furthermore, we confirm the predictions postulated by the theory that more overprecise
subjects have lower returns, and that changes in own portfolio are positively correlated
to subject overprecision. Hence, while wealth increases overprecision, overprecision does
not increase wealth. Finally, we also confirm known results such as the positive effects of
cognitive ability on market performance (Bosch-Rosa et al., 2018; Noussair et al., 2016).
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A Extra Figures and Tables
Figure 4: Two matrices with 220 red dots each, but a different dot pattern.
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Figure 5: Box plots showing the median, 25th and 75th percentile of MDotOPib for each break within a
session
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP1,2 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP2,3 ∆MDotOP1,3 ∆MDotOP1,3
∆assets1,2 0.0104
∗ 0.0103∗
(0.00519) (0.00542)
APOP1,2 -0.0142 -0.0111
(0.0130) (0.0129)
∆assets2,3 0.0108
∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.00366) (0.00348)
APOP2,3 0.0400 0.0421
(0.0275) (0.0251)
∆assets1,3 0.00245 0.00303
(0.00336) (0.00386)
APOP1,3 0.0228
∗ 0.0225∗
(0.0121) (0.0125)
CRT 0.0446 0.152 -0.124 -0.209 -0.315 -0.264
(0.450) (0.389) (0.558) (0.633) (0.558) (0.555)
Male -3.036 -1.126 -1.403 -2.806 -4.544 -4.259
(3.846) (3.443) (2.309) (1.998) (2.768) (2.758)
Risk Aversion -0.321 -0.400 -15.11 -14.83 -15.24∗ -14.61∗
(6.550) (7.264) (9.052) (9.647) (8.056) (8.124)
Constant 4.758 -6.913 6.918 18.89 11.66 14.20
(4.372) (9.870) (6.276) (10.65) (6.800) (12.52)
N 117 117 117 117 117 117
adj. R2 0.011 0.038 0.071 0.075 0.089 0.065
Big Five No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: OLS of the change of context-independent measure of overprecision (∆MDotOPb,b′) on
the change in book value of share across breaks (∆assetsb), the individual level accumulated price-
overprecision across breaks (APOPb,b′), and personality measures. All standard errors are clustered at
the market level.
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B Risk Aversion Measure
For our regression analysis in Tables 2, 5, and 4 we use a composite of the two risk
measures we get from subjects. The first measure is the switching point from lottery A to
the lottery B in a multiple price list like that in Figure 6, this gives us a value between 1
and 10 (HLi) in which the higher the value (i.e., the later the switching point), the more
risk averse a subject is. Subjects are (randomly) paid for their choice in one of the ten
lottery decisions they make.
The second measure of risk aversion we gather is non-incentivized and comes from the
German Socio Economic Panel. The question asks subjects: How likely are you to take
risk on a scale of 0 (not risk taking at all) to 10 (very prone to take risk). The measure
we get is a value between 0 and 10 (GSi) in which the higher it is, the less risk averse a
subject is.
To create the final risk aversion measure we use in our regressions we take three steps:
1. We divide each measure by 10 and 11 (hli = HLi/10 and gsi = GSi/10, respec-
tively), to normalize the measures.
2. We flip cardinal order of the second measure by subtracting each observation from
one (gs′i = 1 − gsi). This makes the measure go from less risk averse to more risk
averse.
3. We create a new measure which we call Risk Aversion (RAi) by giving each nor-
malized measure half of the weight (RAi = gs
′
i/2 + hli/2).
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Figure 6: Screenshot of the risk aversion multiple price list task.
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C Second Market
As is typical in SSW markets, once the market is repeated prices become much closer to
the fundamental value.17 This is clear in the left panel of Figure 7 where we see how most
sessions have prices that closely track the fundamental value. In fact, in Market 2 we see
no session that could be labeled as Increasing Price, as P13 < P6 across all sessions, while
we have three that are Decreasing Price, and nine that are Hump-Shaped.
In the right panel of Figure 7 we show the distribution of the MDotOPib for each of
the two types of price dynamics we find in Market 2. It is clear that there are no changes
in our measure of overprecision (MDotOPib) across breaks. This is confirmed in Table 6
where we see that there is no difference in overprecision across the different breaks.
Such a result seems to confirm our the thesis from Tuckett and Taﬄer (2008) in which
holding and selling assets in an unknown ambiguous environment leads to an integration
of emotional experiences to behavior. In other words, bubbles and overconfidence mostly
arise in markets for exotic/unknown assets. This is a common belief and has been used to
explain the Dot-Com bubble or the most recent crypto-currency craze. In the experimental
literature such an approach has received support from Hussam et al. (2008) who show
that experience eliminates bubbles if the environment is held constant.
Yet, we refrain from drawing any conclusions on this respect from our experimental
design, as our setup does not allow us to cleanly disentangle the effects of individual
learning from overprecision, excitement, and price dynamics. We leave this for future
research.
Break 1 = Break 2 Break 2 = Break 3 Break 1 = Break 3
Hump-shaped p-value (N=90) 0.904 0.923 0.913
Decreasing Price p-value (N=27) 0.643 0.138 0.138
Table 6: P -values resulting from Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test comparing the equality of
matched pairs of observations across Dot-Spot task across different session sub-groups for Market 2.
17This convergence to fundamental values is generally assumed to be due to learning (Smith et al.,
1988; Dufwenberg et al., 2005; Hussam et al., 2008).
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Figure 7: Summary of the dynamics in Market 2.
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